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I. INTRODUCTION 
Transparency comes in many forms, from data to documents. Yet what 
matters most is what transparency does. It reveals. Through revelation, 
transparency can reduce information asymmetry to help markets, 
policymakers, and even decisionmakers at the institutions subject to scrutiny. 
It exposes blind spots and signals opportunities for change. As such, 
transparency is not a final step in progress—it is an early step. Whatever 
transparency reveals, the value is severely limited without action because 
progress is not inevitable. Progress depends on what people and institutions 
do with what is revealed. 
This is both a blessing and a curse. Transparency is easy to be in favor 
of and disproportionally difficult to be against. It can also be the easy way 
out when confronted with a problem. Increasing transparency may let 
policymakers off the hook without passing additional laws, regulations, or 
standards. The phrase caveat emptor comes to mind. Of course, because 
transparency is easier to achieve than more onerous limits on behavior, it also 
 
*Executive Director, Law School Transparency (“LST”). Founded in 2009, LST is a nonprofit dedicated 
to making entry to the legal profession more transparent, affordable, and fair. The author thanks members 
of the Iowa State Bar Association Young Lawyers Division, including Kyle Fry, Thomas Hillers, Abhay 
Nadipuram, Rob Poggenklass, and Maggie White, for co-authoring A Way Forward: Transparency in 
2018. This article draws on that report. The author also thanks Olympia Duhart, Kimber Russell, Marissa 
Olsson, Deborah Merritt, Susan Poser, and Caren Ulrich Stacy for the essential part each played in LST’s 
Women in the Law. That mini-series about the challenges women face in the legal profession sparked 
several recommendations made in this article. 
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provides the opportunity to build genuine progress over time while values 
catch up. Transparency can therefore operate as a powerful, ironically 
discrete tool. 
At times the American Bar Association (“ABA”) Section of Legal 
Education and Admissions to the Bar (“Section”), the accreditor of law 
schools, has acknowledged and responded to problems in legal education 
through transparency measures. The ABA Standards and Rules of Procedure 
for Approval of Law Schools (“Standards”), for example, now expressly 
prohibit schools from providing false, incomplete, or misleading consumer 
information.1 The Standards also require law schools to publish detailed 
employment data on their websites.2  
The impetus for these changes began in 2010, but were caused by 
deceptive marketing practices that had become the norm over several 
decades.3 Specifically, law schools overstated job and salary outcomes.4 The 
lack of transparency and accountability resulted in inflated enrollment, 
inadequate job prospects, and higher prices.5 Once identified, covered by the 
legal and mainstream press, and remedied through changes to the Standards 
and voluntary disclosure norms, law school enrollment fell dramatically, job 
prospects improved, and tuition increases slowed or in some cases declined.6 
Conditional scholarships provide another example of how transparency 
can meaningfully affect law schools. “A conditional scholarship is any 
financial aid award that depends on the student maintaining a minimum grade 
point average or class standing, other than that ordinarily required to remain 
in good academic standing.”7 The New York Times described conditional 
scholarship programs as a “bait and switch” tactic.8 The programs raised 
 
1  AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW 
SCHOOLS 2018–19 35 (2018). 
2  Id. 
3  Kyle McEntee & Patrick J. Lynch, A Way Forward, Improving Transparency in Employment 
Reporting at American Law Schools (Apr. 10, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://www.lawschooltransparency.com/documents/LST_White_Paper_April_2010.pdf. 
4  Id. 
5  Law School Enrollment, LAW SCH. TRANSPARENCY, 
https://data.lawschooltransparency.com/enrollment/all/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2018). 
6  After 1L enrollment peaked in 2010 at 52,404 new students, enrollment fell dramatically in each 
of the next three years, followed by four years of even lower, but steady enrollment between 37,000 and 
38,000 new 1Ls. Id. While smaller class size certainly helps the percentage of the class who can get a 
lawyer job, the entry-level market remains structurally weak. Since 2013, fewer graduates obtained full-
time lawyer jobs each year than the prior year. Law School Job Outcomes, LAW SCH. TRANSPARENCY, 
https://data.lawschooltransparency.com/jobs/legal-jobs/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2018). 
7  Conditional Scholarships, LAW SCH. TRANSPARENCY, 
https://data.lawschooltransparency.com/costs/conditional-scholarships/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2018). 
8  David Segal, How Law Students Lose the Grant Game, and How Schools Win, N.Y. TIMES (May 
1, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/01/business/law-school-grants.html. 
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fairness concerns because students did not fully understand their terms—law 
school grading curves are a harsh reality for students who achieved all A’s 
and B’s in college—and because students were disposed not to re-assess 
continued enrollment once the price drastically changed in the middle of their 
studies, something law schools took advantage of to maximize tuition 
revenue. Starting in 2013, the Section’s governing council (the “Council”) 
required law schools to publish the number of students who receive 
conditional scholarships and the number of those students who lost some or 
all their scholarship value due to law school performance.9 By the 2016-17 
academic year, 36 law schools had eliminated these programs, a reduction of 
29%.10 
The motivation behind the change is tough to definitively pin down. 
Schools fiercely competed for students in that time as the number of law 
school applicants tumbled.11 And some applicants successfully negotiated 
their scholarship conditions away. However, schools also came under 
significant fire from their own faculty, at academic conferences, and in the 
press. Hard data highlighted schools that utilized these scholarship programs 
and showed how students fared. Individuals at schools were forced to assess 
how these practices comported with their values, as well as the school’s. The 
nation’s top law schools in particular fled to higher moral ground.12 
With both employment data and conditional scholarships, transparency 
measures were designed to address known problems. With the latter, schools 
likely responded to dissonance between their values and their choices. With 
the former, the law school applicant market responded to new information to 
produce change. But rebounding applicant demand despite a flat job market 
is likely to showcase the shortcomings of relying on transparency to create a 
system of legal education that suits its important place in society. The 
Section’s transparency measures allow observers to see worsening job 
prospects for graduates coming, but the Standards do not attempt to limit 
enrollment through, for example, a minimum employment rate as the Section 
does with the minimum bar passage standard.13 Likewise the Section could 
have banned conditional scholarships, but instead opted to institute 
 
9  Conditional Scholarships, supra note 7. 
10 Id. The number of law schools with conditional scholarship programs was flat for the first three 
years of data. However, these data were cemented before the new mandatory disclosures. Once the data 
were in the open, the number of schools with these programs fell, first slowly and then more quickly. 
11 Demand for Law School, LAW SCH. TRANSPARENCY, 
https://data.lawschooltransparency.com/enrollment/demand-for-law-school/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2018). 
12 Jerry Organ, Far Fewer Law School Conditional Scholarship Programs in 2016-17 than in 
2011-12, TAXPROF BLOG (Jan. 2, 2018), http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2018/01/far-fewer-
conditional-scholarship-programs-in-2016-17-than-in-2011-12.html. 
13 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 1, at 24; see also Scott F. Norberg, J.D.s and Jobs: 
The Case for an ABA Accreditation Standard on Employment Outcomes, 67 J.L.E. 1035 (2018). 
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mandatory disclosures. Open data access enables researchers to produce new 
information by combining datasets, as illustrated in Part A.3. It also allows 
problems to be identified earlier and systematically, instead of by anecdote. 
Yet the impact on progress—however measured—is limited by what comes 
after transparency, whether standards, market adjustments, or self-correction 
in the face of a moral dilemma. 
The proposals in this article are the product of discussions with young 
lawyers, law students, legal academics, and leadership in various sections and 
divisions in the ABA. Part A outlines transparency proposals related to 
student debt, scholarships, and diversity. Part B considers the costs to law 
schools and the Section from additional data collection and reporting. Part C 
considers constraints related to making the resultant datasets public. Finally, 
Part D provides concluding remarks about the balance between the costs and 
benefits of these proposals. 
The Council already has the authority to collect and require schools to 
publish all the data described below. Standard 104 permits the Council to 
collect these data “in the form, manner, and time frame” it specifies each 
year.14 Rule 49(b) permits the Council to publish these data when “authorized 
under Standard 509 or [when] . . . made public by the law school.”15 Standard 
509 allows the Council to require schools to publish these data “in the form 
and manner and for the time frame designated by the Council.”16 
If enacted, these proposals will shed light on law student debt, 
inequitable pricing practices, and lasting inequality. The resultant data will 
allow legal educators and policymakers to confront difficult realities and to 
direct resources in directions that strengthen and stabilize the law school 
pipeline. Better consumer information will help students make sense of their 
choice, while also shedding light on legal education’s contributions to the 
legal profession’s diversity. It will also lay bare certain decisions schools 
make in how and why they allocate resources. 
This aligns squarely with the Section of Legal Education’s mission and 
values. The Section is the nationally recognized accreditor of law schools, 
but its mission is broader.17 Its mission is also “[t]o be a creative national 
force in providing leadership and services to those responsible for and those 
who benefit from a sound program of legal education and bar admissions.”18 
In July 2017, the Section convened a roundtable of legal education 
stakeholders to discuss how to modify the Standards to encourage innovation 
 
14 Id. at 5. 
15 Id. at 76. 
16 Id. at 35. 
17 Mission Statement, A.B.A., 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/about_us.html (last visited Aug. 24, 2018). 
18 Id. 
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and address challenges related to cost, declining job opportunities, and 
declining bar passage rates. One theme that emerged from the roundtable is 
the necessity of more transparency. While transparency is not a magic bullet, 
the foundation for reform is good data. In the meantime, the following 
recommendations will expand access to valuable data to spark reforms that 
advance the United States legal system. 
II. DATA PROPOSALS 
A. Student Borrowing 
The typical law student borrows a significant sum of money to attend 
law school. In 2017, the average private law school graduate who borrowed 
received $130,145 in student loan disbursements during law school.19 The 
average public law school graduate who borrowed received $92,997 in 
student loans.20 Notably, borrowing averages do not reflect the amount of 
debt owed when repayment begins six months after graduation. For the 2018-
19 academic year, interest immediately begins to accrue for students at 6.6% 
for Stafford Loans (up to $20,500 per year) or 7.6% for Graduate PLUS loans 
(up to the full cost of attendance).21 The government does not subsidize law 
student interest payments during school, thus the cost of the first-year loan 
increases by nearly 25% while the student is studying and before a single 
loan payment is due if the student does not make interest payments or repay 
principal during law school. 
These national averages come from school-level borrowing averages. 
Each school’s average includes any graduate who borrowed at least $1 during 
law school, whether they borrowed for just one semester—perhaps $5,000 to 
pay for a trip—or they borrowed the full cost of attendance each year. While 
the average can tell us about the entire population, it tells us little about 
individual students. With cost of attendance in 2017-18 as high as $95,883 at 
Stanford Law School, student borrowing can vary wildly based on 
scholarships and ability to pay.22 The latest available data show that 55% of 
Stanford Law students pay full price.23 After accounting for interest that 
accumulates during law school, a Stanford graduate who paid full price for 
 
19 Law School Debt, LAW SCH. TRANSPARENCY, 
https://data.lawschooltransparency.com/costs/debt/?scope=national (last visited Aug. 21, 2018). 
20 Id. 
21 2018-19 Federal Student Loan Interest Rates, ACCESSLEX, https://www.accesslex.org/2018-
2019-federal-student-loan-interest-rates (last visited July 27, 2018). 
22 Stanford University Costs, LAW SCH. TRANSPARENCY, 
https://www.lstreports.com/schools/stanford/costs/ (last visited July 27, 2018). 
23 Id. 
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all three years may owe over $300,000 when the first payment is due, even 
factoring in a 2L summer associate salary. 
The public does not know how many (if any) graduates actually borrow 
the full amount, just that 80% of Stanford Law graduates in 2017 borrowed 
at least $1 and that the average graduate borrowed $131,745.24 Perhaps 
borrowing several hundred thousand dollars from one of the nation’s elite 
law schools is not a matter of public interest or concern. But the debt loads at 
schools with worse job and bar exam outcomes can reach astronomical levels 
too. 
Take, for example, Southwestern Law School. Its annual cost of 
attendance was $82,600 in 2017-18.25 Half of its students paid full price.26 
Only 43% of its 2017 graduates obtained a long-term, full-time job that 
requires bar passage within ten months of graduation.27 Only 52.3% of 2017 
graduates passed the California bar exam on the first try.28 The public does 
not know how many, if any, graduates actually borrowed nearly a quarter of 
a million dollars at this school. But unlike for Stanford, the public does not 
know the average amount borrowed at Southwestern Law School because the 
school has not disclosed graduate borrowing data since 2012, when the 
average amount borrowed for the 78.9% of graduates who borrowed was 
$147,976.29 Since that time, tuition at the school is up 23%; net tuition is up 
8%; cost of living is up 12%; the median and 75th percentile scholarship has 
not changed; and the 25th percentile scholarship has declined by a third.30 
Given the cost of legal education and the expected entry-level salaries, 
many graduates face consequential financial strain. The amount of strain 
 
24 Debt by Law School for 2017 Graduates, LAW SCH. TRANSPARENCY, 
https://data.lawschooltransparency.com/costs/debt/?scope=schools&y1=2017 (last visited Aug. 21, 
2018). 
25 Southwestern Law School Costs, LAW SCH. TRANSPARENCY, 
https://www.lstreports.com/schools/southwestern/costs/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2018). 
26 Id. 
27 Southwestern Law School ABA Charts, LAW SCH. TRANSPARENCY, 
https://www.lstreports.com/schools/southwestern/aba/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2018). 
28 Southwestern Law School Bar Exam Outcomes, LAW SCH. TRANSPARENCY 
https://www.lstreports.com/schools/southwestern/bar/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2018). 
29 Debt by Law School for 2012 Graduates, LAW SCH. TRANSPARENCY, 
https://data.lawschooltransparency.com/costs/debt/?scope=schools&y1=2012 (last visited Aug. 21, 
2018). 
30 Compare 2012 Southwestern Law School Standard 509 Report, A.B.A., 
http://abarequireddisclosures.org/Disclosure509.aspx (under the section titled “Standard 509 Information 
Reports”, select “2012” as the year; then select “Southwestern Law School” as the institution; finally, 
click “Generate Report”), with 2017 Southwestern Law School Standard 509 Report, A.B.A, 
http://abarequireddisclosures.org/Disclosure509.aspx (under the section titled “Standard 509 Information 
Reports”, select “2017” as the year; then select “Southwestern Law School” as the institution; finally, 
click “Generate Report”), and Net Tuition for U.S. Law Schools, LAW SCH. TRANSPARENCY, 
https://data.lawschooltransparency.com/costs/net-tuition/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2018). 
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differs greatly based on the amount an individual owes. Financial advisors 
typically recommend devoting no more than 10 or 15% of income to debt 
service.31 A graduate who borrows $110,000 owes roughly $125,000 at first 
payment, which translates to a monthly payment of about $1,400 on the 
standard ten-year plan. To remain in range of the recommendation, the 
graduate must make between $112,000 (for 15%) and $168,000 (for 10%). 
This graduate would devote 24% of her pre-tax salary if she earns the median 
entry-level salary of $70,000 for 2017 graduates in long-term, full-time law 
jobs.32 She would devote 34% of her pre-tax salary if she borrowed $147,976 
(Southwestern’s 2012 average amount borrowed).33 The burden accelerates 
with a greater amount borrowed, a lower salary, or both. 
The Section of Legal Education does not publish any school-level 
borrowing data, although the Section does collect related data as part of its 
annual questionnaire to law schools. Each law school must report the total 
amount borrowed by all J.D. students for the previous academic year, as well 
as the number of J.D. students who borrowed.34 From this, the Section can 
calculate the average amount borrowed for a single year of law school. When 
combined with the total J.D. enrollment, the Section can also calculate the 
percentage who borrowed. In the past, the Section measured the cumulative 
 
31 Loan Debt and Repayment, COLLEGE BOARD, https://bigfuture.collegeboard.org/pay-for-
college/loans/loan-debt-and-repayment (last visited Aug. 21, 2018). 
32 NAT’L ASS’N FOR LAW PLACEMENT, CLASS OF 2017 NATIONAL SUMMARY REPORT 
(2018), https://www.nalp.org/uploads/Classof2017_NationalSummaryReport.pdf. These salary numbers 
are not perfect, but they overstate rather than understate salaries.The percentage of a graduating class 
employed in jobs that require a law license is sensitive to two distinct supply figures: total graduates and 
total available jobs. For example, if graduates increase and the number of jobs stays the same, the 
percentage will decline. The percentage of graduates obtaining full-time entry-level legal jobs was quite 
high in the 1980s, peaking at 84.5% in 1988. The average rate in the mid to late 1980s was 82.9%. The 
next two decades (90s and 00s) each had an average that was ten points lower, 73.7% in the 90s and 71.4% 
in the 00s. This decade, so far, the average is 61.7%—an additional ten points lower. National Report on 
Law School Job Outcomes, LAW SCH. TRANSPARENCY, 
https://data.lawschooltransparency.com/jobs/legal-jobs/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2018).Strikingly, these 
shifts appear to reflect enrollment management decisions by law schools instead of demand for new 
lawyers. Between 1976 and 2000, law schools steadily enrolled between ~40,000 and ~44,000 new 
students each year. From 1976 to 1987, the average was 40,973. From 1988 to 2000, the average was 
43,497—a little over 6% higher. But between 2000 and 2002, law schools increased first-year enrollment 
11.2%. In subsequent years, enrollment steadily creeped up, with minor ebbs and flows, until peaking in 
2010 at 52,404. The number of jobs, on the other hand, has been far steadier. Between 1985, the first year 
for which we were able to analyze data, and 2010, the number of new full-time law jobs each year 
generally stayed between 27,000 and 30,000. Increased enrollment and a steady number of jobs spell a 
lower employment rate for law school graduates. Id. 
33 Using a weighted interest of 7.2%, she would owe just over $169,000, which translates to just 
shy of a $2000 monthly payment on a standard ten-year plan. 
34 Annual Questionnaire, A.B.A. (2018), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/questionnaire.html (last visited Aug. 21, 
2018) (scroll down and select “Part IV: Financial Aid instructions and questions” and download Word 
document). 
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amount a graduating class borrowed for law school. This old measurement 
produces the figures peppered throughout this article. 
Up-to-date graduate borrowing figures are possible because U.S. News 
& World Report continued to request the data after the Section changed the 
cohort and time period for which they measured student borrowing. 
Accordingly, public borrowing data for all years of law school come from 
voluntary disclosures by law schools to U.S. News. This comes with several 
clear consequences. 
Consumers, schools, and researchers lose out because the only source 
for law school borrower data is a news magazine that muddies the decision-
making process for consumers and schools alike. The Section encourages 
people to visit the U.S. News website through its decision not to publish these 
borrowing data. These data are not as reliable as they would be if they were 
reported to and published by the Section. Every year, more than a handful of 
schools make erroneous disclosures to U.S. News, which only occasionally 
get corrected. For example, some law schools routinely report to U.S. News 
the average borrowed by all J.D. students who borrow, presumably because 
school administrators assume the U.S. News survey instrument matches the 
Section’s questionnaire. One additional consequence of a voluntary 
publishing regime is that, every year, a dozen or so schools decline to publish 
the average amount borrowed by graduates.35 
That said, the average amount borrowed by graduates and the 
percentage borrowing are limited in utility to consumers, although there is 
value in confronting consumers with figures that account for several years of 
schooling instead of just the annual cost of attendance. The average amount 
borrowed also helps journalists, advocates, and policymakers to 
contextualize bar passage and employment rates, as well as entry-level 
salaries. It is important for the Section to return to collecting borrower data 
for graduates in addition to borrower data during a single academic year, even 
if graduate borrowing data are imperfect. For example, a transfer student who 
graduates from the school after the first year will not have all borrowing 
captured. Graduate borrowing figures also exclude those who never 
graduated, whether they failed out or left voluntarily. 
Beyond publishing the data the Section used to collect, the Section 
would do a great service to legal education if it enabled consumers, 
researchers, and internal influencers, such as faculty, to peer underneath the 
surface figures (average borrowed) to see the borrower makeup. Shedding 
light on underlying borrowing data may stir policymakers, faculty, and 
administrators to think more clearly and realistically about the problem of 
student debt. One way to do this is through a frequency distribution, which 
 
35 Debt by Law School for 2017 Graduates, supra note 24. 
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“displays the frequency of various outcomes in a sample.”36 The following 
data table, Table A, uses $10,000 bands. Figure A applies the data table in 
graphic form (axes/data labels omitted), along with a modified box-and-
whisker plot to represent the median and the interquartile range. 
 
Table A 
Amount Borrowed # Graduates $ # $ # 
$0 40 $60,000-$69,999 11 $130,000-$139,999 9 
$1 - $9999 2 $70,000-$79,999 11 $140,000-$149,999 7 
$10,000 - $19,999 3 $80,000-$89,999 16 $150,000-$159,999 3 
$20,000 - $29,999 5 $90,000-$99,999 28 $160,000-$169,999 5 
$30,000 - $39,999 7 $100,000-$109,999 30 $170,000-$179,999 10 
$40,000 - $49,999 10 $110,000-$119,999 18 $180,000-$189,999 11 
$50,000 - $59,999 14 $120,000-$129,999 10 $190,000-$199,999 15 
Median of Borrowers $104,000     
Mean of Borrowers $106,250     
 
 Figure A 
 
In legal education, the most famous application of a frequency 
distribution is NALP’s bi-modal salary distribution curve (shown below, 
Figure B). This curve continues to shape how policymakers, researchers, 
consumers, and the public understand entry-level salaries. The mean salary 
may have been $82,292 for 2014 graduates, but very few graduates made at 
 
36 Frequency Distribution, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frequency_distribution (last 
visited Aug. 21, 2018). 
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or near that amount. Instead graduates fell into one of two “humps”—
$160,000 on the one side and between $40,000 and $65,000 on the other.37 It 
is impactful because readers must confront the individuals that make up the 
averages. 
 
Figure B 
 
In an ideal world, the public would know how much graduates owe 
when the first payment is due including interest, but this is not possible 
without federal legislation. Instead, the Section should collect data on student 
loan borrowing outcomes for graduates and publish those outcomes using a 
frequency distribution table, including non-borrowers, using its authority 
under Standard 104 and Rule 49(b). 
This proposal poses no additional collection burden and minimal 
reporting burden for law schools. As evidenced by roughly 90% of law 
schools voluntarily disclosing the average amount borrowed to U.S. News 
each year, the burden would be negligible for schools to report the relevant 
figures once again to the Section. Further, the reason law schools can 
calculate an average at all is that the schools process student loans for their 
students. Reporting individual records, properly anonymized in the same way 
as employment outcome records, would require minimal staff time and 
produce valuable data for public consumption. 
B. Tuition Prices and Discounts 
Over the past several decades, law school tuition has increased 
dramatically, well above inflation. Compared to tuition in 1985, private and 
 
37 Salary Distribution Curves, NAT’L ASS’N FOR L. PLACEMENT, 
http://www.nalp.org/salarydistrib (last visited Sept. 22, 2017). 
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public law school tuition is 2.7 and 5.8 times as expensive after accounting 
for inflation.38 The average private law school tuition was $46,329 in 2017, 
with residents at public schools paying an average of $26,425 per year.39 The 
range of tuition, however, demonstrates remarkable variability. At public 
schools, one year of resident tuition ranged from $7,383 to $58,300.40 At 
private schools, the range was $16,418 to $67,564 per year.41 While the 
average tuition at top performing law schools is much higher than the rest, 
prices do not scale with job outcomes elsewhere.42 The average tuition at the 
lowest performing schools is similar to the average for mid-range schools.43 
Law schools engage in significant tuition discounting through grants 
and scholarships. Although the nominal tuition price has increased, it does 
not tell the whole story. About 30% of students pay full price.44 For the 70% 
receiving a discount, the discounts have shifted away from need-based 
discounts based on ability to pay towards merit-based discounts based on 
LSAT and undergraduate GPA. Those with the highest LSATs and GPAs 
receive the discounts. As such, the students who are least likely to complete 
school, pass the bar, and get a job subsidize the students who are more likely 
to succeed. These also tend to be the students who are the most 
disadvantaged.45 
The Section of Legal Education collects and publishes useful data 
related to how much students pay for their legal education. The Section 
currently requires schools to report and publish for full-time and part-time 
students: tuition and fees; scholarship data by the median and interquartile 
range; and scholarship data by the percentage of tuition covered, e.g. what 
percentage of all students have a scholarship that covers up to 50% of 
tuition.46 Moreover, the Section requires schools to report and publish 
 
38 Law School Tuition in the United States 1985–2017, LAW SCH. TRANSPARENCY, 
https://www.data.lawschooltransparency.com/costs/tuition/?y1=1985&y2=2017 (last visited Aug. 21, 
2018). 
39 Id. 
40 Law School Tuition Grouped by 2016 Job Outcomes, LAW SCH. TRANSPARENCY, 
https://www.data.lawschooltransparency.com/costs/tuition/?y1=2016&y2=2017&scope=jobs (last 
visited Aug. 21, 2018). 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Net Tuition for U.S. Law Schools, supra note 30. 
45 LAW SCH. SURVEY OF STUDENT ENGAGEMENT, LAW SCHOOL SCHOLARSHIP POLICIES: 
ENGINES OF INEQUITY 2016 ANNUAL SURVEY RESULTS (2016), http://lssse.indiana.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2015/12/LSSSE-2016-Annual-Report-1.pdf. 
46 Annual Questionnaire, supra note 34. 
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whether and how often they reduce or eliminate scholarships after poor 
academic performance.47 
The Section already recognizes the value of publicly available price 
information for consumers, researchers, and the public. But with increased 
discounting and the shift away from need-based aid, additional clarity would 
add additional value. The utility of data for policymaking and decision-
making depends not only on whether data are publicly available, but also data 
presentation. The Section can further its efforts of helping people understand 
the cost of legal education with frequency distribution tables for tuition paid 
by students using relatively narrow distribution bands. The Section should 
collect data on tuition paid by each enrolled individual and publish up to four 
frequency distributions tables per law school—one for 1L tuition paid, one 
for upper-level tuition paid, and a distinction for part-time and full-time as 
necessary—using its authority under Standard 104 and Rule 49(b). 
This proposal poses no additional collection burden and minimal 
reporting burden for law schools. In fact, rather than a new style of 
information, this proposal merely improves upon the frequency distribution 
table the Section already utilizes for how much tuition students pay, referred 
above as “scholarship data by the percentage of tuition covered.” Table B 
reproduces a Standard 509 Information Report arbitrarily selected (seriously) 
from ABArequireddisclosures.org, with several stylistic and linguistic 
clarifications to showcase its contents. The clearly erroneous part-time 
column is reproduced without any adjustment. 
 
Table B 
 All Full Time Part Time 
Total Students 248 100% 240 97% 8 3% 
No Grant Received 44 18% 67 26% 0 0% 
Receiving Any Grant 204 82% 177 74% 27 338% 
< Half Tuition 81 33% 71 30% 10 125% 
Half to Full Tuition 57 23% 48 20% 9 113% 
Full Tuition 48 19% 45 19% 3 38% 
> Full Tuition 18 7% 13 5% 5 63% 
 
The proposal (below, Table C) would improve the precision of the table 
by introducing narrower bands than the first column in Table B. The proposal 
also reframes, for the sake of precision, the bands from the percentage of 
tuition to the amount of tuition paid. These simple changes will help people 
 
47 Id. 
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connect tuition prices to the real lives affected by them. The resultant 
Table C showcases the transactional nature of tuition discounting, rather 
than a framework that treats scholarships as acts of generosity, which restricts 
how consumers, policymakers, and internal decision-makers understand and 
act on the information. Law school financial aid and admissions 
administrators frequently and rightfully complain that prospective students 
focus too much on the scholarship amount, rather than on the price they 
would pay. Consider a student who receives a $10,000 scholarship at School 
A with $35,000 annual tuition and a $20,000 scholarship at comparable 
School B with $45,000 annual tuition. Although the price paid is the same, 
students in his or her position often complain about disparate scholarship 
amounts. 
 
Table C 
Tuition Paid, Full Time # Students $ # 
$0  58 $18,000 - $20,999 [0-48] 
$1 - $2,999 [0-48] $21,000 - $23,999 [0-27] 
$3,000 - $5,999 [0-48] $24,000 - $26,999 [0-27] 
$6,000 - $8,999 [0-48] $27,000 - $29,999 [0-27] 
$9,000 - $11,999 [0-48] $30,000 - $32,999 [0-27] 
$12,000 - $14,999 [0-48] $33,000 - $35,999 [0-27] 
$15,000 - $17,999 [0-48] $36,000 - $38,999 44 
Median Tuition Paid $25,706 $39,000 - $41,999 63 
Mean Tuition Paid $28,071   
 
Table C is the author’s best estimate using publicly available data. The 
range of students for the distribution bands from $1 to $35,999 (75 total 
students) were derived from the frequency distribution table on the Standard 
509 Information Report. The interquartile range and median produced a 
different distribution across those bands—and the distributions contradicted 
each other, almost surely due to a data reporting error by the unnamed law 
school. 
As this table merely refashions how the price paid by students is 
communicated to the public, the burden would be negligible for law schools 
to report the necessary data to the Section. Every law school can account for 
how much its students pay—in fact, it is necessary to know this for any school 
that processes Title IV student loans (all law schools). Reporting individual 
records, properly anonymized in the same way as employment outcome 
records, would require minimal staff time and produce valuable data for 
public consumption. It also has the added benefit of holding law school deans 
accountable for public and private claims about net tuition. 
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C. Gender Diversity 
In 1965, just 1 in 25 law students was a woman. That number steadily 
climbed to 1 in 4 in 1975; 1 in 3 in 1980; and since 2000, the proportions 
have been roughly equal—though slightly more men than women every year 
except the 2017 entering class. Parity in law school enrollment marked an 
enormous milestone, but new research demonstrates that national parity 
masks lurking gender inequality. 
The research shows three significant “leaks” in the law school pipeline 
for women.48 The first of these leaks involves women applying to law school. 
Even though women are 57% of college graduates, they account for only 
about 51% of the law school applicants.49 If women applied at the same rate 
as men to law school, applications would increase 16%.50 The second leak is 
that women who apply to law school are less likely than men to be admitted. 
For the class entering in 2015, law schools admitted about 80% of the men 
who applied, but just 76% of the women who applied.51 The third leak is that, 
even when women are admitted, they are not spread evenly across law 
schools. They instead cluster disproportionately in schools with the weakest 
employment outcomes and worst reputations.52 
The first and second leaks go back several decades. The third leak, 
however, is new and worsening. In 2001, when schools had just gotten to 
roughly 50/50 nationwide, women were evenly distributed amongst 
schools.53 But by 2006 the story had started to change. Although the pattern 
did not yet reach statistically significant, it had started to emerge. By 2015, 
the pattern was statistically significant and quite stark. Today, the top 50 
schools are the mirror opposite of the bottom 50 schools.54 
The emerging explanations mostly relate to the U.S. News law school 
rankings, with the most compelling relating to schools jockeying for higher 
LSAT scorers to increase the median score, which is a considerable driver of 
ranking. Over the past 15 years, in their quest to secure or improve their U.S. 
News ranking, law schools have decided to emphasize LSAT scores more in 
admissions decisions. This emphasis may explain, in part, the emergence of 
the third leak over the course of a decade. Women actually score two points 
worse on average than men on the LSAT, and there are fewer higher scorers 
 
48 LST’s Women in the Law: Leaky Pipeline – Assumptions and Law Schools, LST RADIO (Nov. 
30, 2016), https://www.lstradio.com/women/?theme=lp1. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
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as well.55 This is typical of standardized tests with predominately multiple 
choice questions, unlike writing examinations that tend to favor women.56 
Additional explanations may include an uneven distribution of applicants 
(perhaps increased median LSATs drive applicants away), uneven 
distribution of scholarship money (perhaps because schools overvalue the 
extra two points they get from men), and scholarship negotiation tendencies 
(perhaps because women are less likely to ask for more or any money). 
Additional data will provide a more robust understanding of very concerning 
patterns related to progress for gender diversity in the legal profession. 
The Section of Legal Education collects rafts of data from law schools 
by gender yet publishes almost none of it. The Section has had a standing 
practice of publishing the gender breakdown of the entire student body, 
which is how the author discovered the third leak. But only beginning with 
the 2017-18 academic year did the Section break this out by the year in 
school, e.g. the number of women 1Ls. However, the number of 1Ls is a 
different number than the number in the first-year class, which the Section 
collects but does not publish. The latter does not include, for example, 
students who were re-admitted after academic dismissal or re-enrolled after 
voluntarily leaving.57 Likewise, the Section collects but does not publish 
gender data for the number of applicants, the number of admitted applicants, 
the number of graduates, the number of transfers, and the number attritted.58 
The Section should publish these data in the interest of its efforts to 
diversify the legal profession and to promote fairness using its authority 
under Rule 49(b). Under the same authority, along with Standard 104, the 
Section can further these efforts by collecting and publishing gender data 
related to scholarship amounts, conditional scholarships, and first-year class 
profiles. 
Together and apart, these data may illuminate unknown problems and 
explain known ones. These data may also help consumers make informed 
choices. As outlined in the previous subpart on tuition and borrowing, law 
school is expensive. Reducing the information asymmetry—allowing 
 
55 SUSAN P. DALESSANDRO, ET AL., LSAT PERFORMANCE WITH REGIONAL, GENDER, AND 
RACIAL/ETHNIC BREAKDOWNS: 2005–2006 THROUGH 2011–2012 TESTING YEARS 17 (2012). 
56 SAMUEL A. LIVINGSTON & STACIE L. RUPP, PERFORMANCE OF MEN AND WOMEN ON 
MULTIPLE-CHOICE AND CONSTRUCTED-RESPONSE TESTS FOR BEGINNING TEACHERS 17 (2004); THE AM. 
PHYSICAL SOC’Y, FIGHTING THE GENDER GAP: STANDARDIZED TESTS ARE POOR INDICATORS OF ABILITY 
IN PHYSICS 3 (2016), https://www.aps.org/publications/apsnews/199607/upload/jul96.pdf; Andrew 
Hacker, Standardized Tests are the New Glass Ceiling, NATION (Mar. 1, 2016), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/standardized-tests-are-a-new-glass-ceiling/. 
57 Annual Questionnaire, supra note 34. 
58 Id. Gender numbers for the first-year class are required to fully understand the three 
abovementioned leaks because the number of 1Ls is not interoperable with the number of applicants and 
admitted applicants. In other words, calculating the yield rates for women applicants and women admitted 
applicants is impossible from the now-public number of women 1Ls. 
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students to more clearly understand their bargaining position—will help them 
to pay less, which would reduce debt and/or enhance the school options. 
Additionally, these data will help the Section analyze compliance with 
Standard 206(a). Standard 206(a) provides that “a law school shall 
demonstrate by concrete action a commitment to diversity and inclusion by 
providing full opportunities for the study of law and entry into the profession 
by members of underrepresented groups, particularly racial and ethnic 
minorities, and a commitment to having a student body that is diverse with 
respect to gender, race, and ethnicity.”59 If a school, even inadvertently, is 
biasing enrollment towards men because it is too concerned with chasing a 
higher ranking, then the school may be out of compliance with the ABA’s 
Standards. 
Most of this proposal involves the Section making public data it already 
collects from law schools. For the data the Section does not yet collect by 
gender—scholarship amounts, conditional scholarships, and first-year class 
profiles—this proposal poses minimal burden. Law schools already classify 
every student and graduate by gender. Law schools also already possess 
individual, organized records for each of the proposed data categories. 
Matching these two datasets, to the extent law schools do not do so already, 
would require minimal staff time, produce valuable data for public 
consumption, and help decisionmakers and policymakers meet diversity 
objectives. 
D. Racial and Ethnic Diversity 
Whereas tremendous progress has been made towards gender parity, 
even with the emerging trend of gender clustering at the most and least 
reputable schools, significant progress remains for enrollment by race and 
ethnicity.60 
 
Table D 
 Hispanic NA Asian Black Hawaiian White 2+ Races 
2016 1Ls 13.7% 0.5% 6.5% 9.6% 0.1% 65.2% 4.3% 
US Population 17.8% 1.3% 5.7% 13.3% 0.2% 61.3% 2.6% 
 
 
59  AMERICAN BAR Association, supra note 1, at 12. 
60 Statistics, A.B.A., 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/statistics.html (last visited Sept. 28, 
2017) (Under “Bar Passage and Enrollment Data” select “2017 1L Enrollment by Gender & 
Race/Ethnicity” and download Word doc). Excludes unknowns and non-resident 1Ls. U.S. Population 
percentages come from the U.S. Census. Quick Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045216 (last visited Sept. 28, 2017). 
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Aaron Taylor, the executive director of AccessLex’s Center for Legal 
Education Excellence, observed similar trends with race and ethnicity as the 
previous subpart outlined about gender. Taylor found that Black and 
Hispanic students were more likely to attend schools with lower median 
LSAT scores, which tend to be less prestigious.61 Whereas White and Asian 
students were more likely to attend more prestigious schools with higher 
LSAT median scores.62 Taylor told the National Jurist that “[t]his affects 
long-term outcomes, career trajectories and payoffs from law school 
investments. There are many implications tied in large part to race and 
ethnicity.”63 
Even on the tuition and debt front, the implications are huge. According 
to the Law School Survey of Student Engagement (LSSSE), then-directed by 
Taylor, “[i]t seems apparent that increased costs of attending law school have 
placed undue pressures on students from less affluent backgrounds to rely on 
student loans to finance their education. This burden falls disproportionately 
on Black and Hispanic students, who are more likely to come from low-
wealth backgrounds.”64 Less than 5% of Black students and less than 10% of 
Hispanic students expected zero law school debt.65 For White students, it was 
about 20% and for Asian students about 25%.66 On the high end, about 25% 
of White students expected debt in excess of $120,000, compared to almost 
45% of Black students and about 40% of Hispanic students.67 
Of course, these disparities relate to the “large racial and ethnic wealth 
disparities in the U.S.”68 But they also appear to relate to law school 
scholarship policies, because wealth explains part of the divergence in LSAT 
scores, which play an outsized role in determining the price a student pays to 
attend law school. According to LSSSE’s 2016 report, which had a response 
rate of 53% from 72 different law schools, two in three White students 
receive a merit scholarship, while just one in two Black and Hispanic students 
do.69 
 
61 Aaron Taylor, Diversity as a Law School Survival Strategy 17 (Saint Louis U. Legal Studies 
Research Paper No. 2015-1, 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2569847. 
62 Id. 
63 Laira Martin, Law Schools Enrolling More Minorities to Combat Enrollment Drop, NAT’L 
JURIST (Feb. 17, 2015), http://www.nationaljurist.com/prelaw/law-schools-admitting-more-minorities-
combat-enrollment-drop. 
64 LAW SCH. SURVEY OF STUDENT ENGAGEMENT, HOW A DECADE OF DEBT CHANGED LAW 
SCHOOL EXPERIENCE 12 (2015), http://lssse.indiana.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/LSSSE-Annual-
Report-2015-Update-FINAL-revised-web.pdf. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 1, 4, 9. 
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The LSSSE dataset is the only available dataset on race/ethnicity and 
scholarships, so school-specific data are not publicly available. Using its 
authority under Rule 49(b) and Standard 104, the Section of Legal Education 
should collect and publish race/ethnicity data related to scholarship amounts 
and conditional scholarships. 
Despite the lack of race/ethnicity scholarship data, by and large, the 
Section does a much better job at publishing the race/ethnicity data it collects 
each year compared to gender data. It publishes breakdowns by race/ethnicity 
for the number of graduates, the number enrolled by the year in school, the 
number of transfers, and the number attrited.70 However, as with gender, the 
Section does not publish the data it collects by race/ethnicity for the number 
of applicants, offered applicants, and enrollees (first-year class).71 This leaves 
gaps that relieve schools of accountability in light of common promises to 
advance diversity. The Section should publish these data using its authority 
under Rule 49(b). 
Enhancing the race/ethnicity dataset may illuminate unknown problems 
and explain known ones, as well as help consumers more clearly understand 
their bargaining position and make informed choices. Additionally, these 
data will help the Section analyze compliance with Standard 206(a). Most of 
this proposal involves the Section making public data it already collects from 
law schools. For the data it does not yet collect by gender—scholarship 
amounts and conditional scholarships—this proposal poses minimal burden. 
Law schools already classify every student and graduate by race/ethnicity 
and can match datasets, as with the gender data. This would require minimal 
staff time, produce valuable data for public consumption, and help 
decisionmakers and policymakers meet diversity objectives. 
E. Additional Diversity Data 
For the foregoing reasons outlined in the subparts on race/ethnicity and 
gender data, the public would also benefit if the data requested in the subparts 
on tuition prices and student borrowing outcomes were publicly accessible 
by race/ethnicity and gender. The Section of Legal Education may do so 
under its current authority under Standard 104 and Rule 49(b). This proposal 
poses no additional collection burden and minimal reporting burden for law 
schools—the same dataset matching requirement from the previous two 
subparts. 
 
70 Annual Questionnaire, supra note 34. 
71 Id. 
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III. COSTS OF ADDITIONAL DATA COLLECTION AND REPORTING 
The costs of additional data collection and reporting are relevant to any 
discussion about the value of transparency efforts. As outlined for each 
proposal in Part A, the Section of Legal Education already has the authority 
to cause schools to report the relevant data. Not even one of the above 
proposals requires law schools to collect new data. In some cases, such as the 
number of women applicants, law schools already report the data to the 
Section. In other cases, such as scholarship amounts by gender, schools may 
need to connect two datasets, e.g. the list of students with their genders and 
the list of students by their scholarship. Regardless, the schools have all the 
relevant data and the reporting burden for each proposal is minimal. 
But this article argues for the adoption of all these proposals—not just 
one. As such, the aggregate cost of collecting and reporting these data, 
including the burden born by the Section, is relevant to assessing the value 
of the efforts relative to the policy goals. Law schools already have direct 
access to all data proposed above. The cost of reporting, therefore, comes 
down to how schools submit the data to the Section and how the Section 
processes the data. These choices belong to the Section through its 
accreditation authority. 
In some cases, the Section chooses to collect data in summary form. The 
school counts the number of students in a category and reports the total 
number in an individual cell. That is the equivalent of asking schools to 
populate a data table, such as Tables A, B, and C embedded earlier in this 
article. In other cases, the Section chooses to collect raw data and the school 
reports all students on the equivalent of a spreadsheet. Each row is a different 
student, distinguished by a unique individual identifier; each column 
indicates something about the student. The Section previously asked for first-
year enrollment data in this way. The school reported a list of all first-year 
students and their LSAT and GPA.72 From the list, the Section calculated the 
25th, 50th, and 75th percentile LSATs and GPAs. 
The second approach allows the Section to more easily audit the 
reported data and do national analyses with the data. The first approach is 
less work for the Section and puts the onus on proper summarization on the 
law schools. As shown in Table B above, schools do not always do that 
correctly. 
For law schools, their reporting burden stems from connecting just two 
spreadsheets or database tables—depending on how the school organizes its 
data. The first (Spreadsheet A) is for all graduates in a given year and 
schools possess it in nearly, if not exactly, this form already. 
 
72 Id. 
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Spreadsheet A 
Class of 201x Graduate Data    
Graduate ID Gender Race/Ethnicity Total Borrowed 
123456 M/F/O White/Black/Etc. $zz,zzz 
 
From Spreadsheet A, the law school can either export the data to the 
Section or produce the required statistical summaries, whichever the Section 
chooses. The second (Spreadsheet B) is for all students in a given year. Some 
schools may already have a spreadsheet or database table like this, but each 
can readily generate it because each column is associated somewhere in a law 
school’s records with a unique individual identifier. 
 
Spreadsheet B 
201x - 201x 
Academic Year 
Student Data     
Student ID Class Gender Race/Ethnicity Program 
654321 1L/2L/3L M/W/O White/Black/Etc FT/PT 
     
 
Tuition &  
Fees Paid 
Tuition 
Discount 
Conditional 
Scholarship 
Reduced or 
Eliminated 
 $zz,zzz $zz,zzz Yes/No/Blank Yes/No/Blank 
 
These spreadsheets produce all the data necessary for the above 
proposals, except for data in two categories. The first category includes data 
that the Section already collects, e.g. the number of women who applied, 
were admitted, and who enrolled. The schools and Section have no additional 
reporting burden. The second category has only one dataset: first-year class 
profiles by gender. The Law School Admissions Council (LSAC) can 
generate these data for law schools through the organization’s ACES2 student 
management software, which every law school uses. Already the Section 
relies on LSAC to help schools report first-year enrollment data to the 
Section.73 To report these statistical profiles for gender, LSAC would only 
need to add a gender column to the list it already provides schools. LSAC, 
having been apprised of this proposal, has agreed to do so. 
In sum, schools can create two spreadsheets from existing datasets and 
download a report from LSAC with ease. For the Section of Legal Education, 
the additional burden is well worth it, even if it chooses the more laborious 
task of maintaining individual records for each new dataset. The effort 
produces significant, valuable data that advances its mission that reaches 
 
73 Id. “LSAC will provide each law school . . . a list of first-year enrollees from the data entered 
in the ACES2 system. Once each law school has verified the information provided by LSAC, the 
information will be shared with the [Section of Legal Education].” Id. 
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beyond accrediting law schools, as well as helps it to enforce Standard 204 
and Standard 509. 
IV. COSTS OF ADDITIONAL DATA PUBLICATION 
Not all data the Section of Legal Education collects winds up published. 
This article has thus far made the case for the Section to publish additional 
data under its Rule 49(b) authority. The Section currently publishes data in a 
variety of formats on its website, including national summaries, spreadsheets, 
and school-specific reports. These data help analysts repurpose the data for 
presentation, whether as part of scholarship, consumer-facing tools, policy-
making research, or internal research. The proposals in Part A are consistent 
with the Section’s current practices related to making data public for analysts. 
Standard 509 also permits the Section to require law schools to publicly 
disclose information on their websites “in the form and manner and for the 
time frame designated by the [Section].”74 The Section requires schools to 
publish a variety of important consumer information on their individual 
websites, including tabular and summarized data on reports, text descriptions, 
lists, and more. This information helps consumers decide whether and where 
to go to law school. 
The decision to make data public and to require schools to disclose 
information in their own materials are related, but can produce divergent 
results because the audiences, while overlapping, differ. There is little reason 
to worry about broad disclosures on the Section’s various websites provided 
the data are contextualized and reliable. The Section also publishes 
definitions, survey instruments, and guidance memos. A law school can be 
sanctioned or lose its accreditation for reporting false or incomplete data to 
the Section.  
Open access to data has enhanced data integrity since the Section began 
to publish spreadsheets with school-level employment data for the class of 
2011. Since that time, external parties have caught and reported errors, 
usually before legal and mainstream press stories. In the early years, schools 
and the Section made innocent mistakes that would not have been caught in 
a timely fashion, if at all, but for open access for analysts. Today, there are 
fewer mistakes in employment data as the Section has refined its pre-release 
process.75 
 
74 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 1, at 35. 
75 The importance of open datasets cannot be understated, but it is not a guarantee that the public 
will catch problems either. The erroneous data the author happened upon, reproduced in Table B, is 
available to the public as part of a spreadsheet on the Section website. At least seven other schools made 
this same reporting error for the 2017-18 school year. The Section must also be more vigilant in its use of 
the resources it makes available. 
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The decision to publish data for consumer use is more complicated. It 
involves choices about how to organize and summarize a dataset, which 
translates data from its raw form into meaningful information for use by less 
sophisticated, more impressionable audiences. With any dataset, the data can 
be presented in various forms, including charts, graphs, and tables. The best 
method depends on the audience(s). Presentation choices must balance what 
the audience wants to know and what they should want to know, along with 
consideration to information overload, complexity, and utility. Importantly, 
these choices set the benchmark for what matters to the audience. 
The default position should be for schools to publish information that 
will help consumers decide whether and where to attend law school, provided 
the Section collects the underlying data through Standard 104 and may 
require schools to publish through Standard 509. The proposals in Part A are 
not only pre-authorized for the Section, but will also help students understand 
important financial details, their bargaining power with schools, and where 
schools’ priorities lie. However, these proposals add substantially to what a 
consumer is asked to mine through and understand. The additions may prove 
to be so overwhelming that consumers ignore important information, making 
them worse off. 
Already, each law school publishes four PDF reports prescribed by the 
Section and “current information on refund policies; curricular offerings, 
academic calendar, and academic requirements; and policies regarding 
transfer of credit earned at another institution, including a list of institutions 
with which the law school has established articulation agreements” in a 
“readable and comprehensible manner.”76 The first PDF is the Standard 509 
Information Report, which details a variety of statistics that help students 
figure out when to apply, whether they can get in, how much it costs, how 
diverse the student body is, and at what rate students complete school.77 The 
second PDF is the Employment Summary Report and includes graduate 
employment data.78 The third and fourth PDFs are the First-Time Bar Passage 
and Ultimate Bar Passage reports, which detail bar exam outcomes for two 
different measurement periods.79 
The Section extracted the employment and bar passage data from the 
Standard 509 Information Report in recent years. In 2011, the Section 
changed disclosure requirements for graduate employment outcomes. In 
 
76 AM. BAR ASS’N, MANAGING DIRECTOR’S GUIDANCE MEMO (2016), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_
bar/governancedocuments/2016_standard_509_guidance_memo_final.authcheckdam.pdf. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 The July 2016 Guidance Memo has not been publicly updated for the bar-related information 
reports. 
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2018, the Section changed disclosure requirements for bar exam outcomes. 
In both cases, the Section changed when schools published information. 
Likewise, the Section increased how much information schools published. 
This ensured more timely and more comprehensible publication of important 
consumer information. 
Nevertheless, the Standard 509 Information Report remains dense even 
with the three additional reports because the Section has continued to add 
data to benefit consumers. The changes built on an outdated format, however. 
The Standard 509 Information Report was originally designed two decades 
ago for print in the LSAC Official Guide. The current PDF is not the optimal 
method for distributing information given modern advances in technology 
and design theory. 
If the Section finds some or all the proposed disclosures sufficiently 
valuable for consumers, the Section should reevaluate its approach. The 
Section should continue to publish most, if not all, of the current data, as well 
as most, if not all, of the proposed data. But modest changes to how the 
Section styles, words, and formats the disclosures will maximize 
comprehension of, and confidence in, the contents. Fear of information 
overload, however, should only be used as justification to withhold 
information after alternative presentation formats are dutifully explored. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The transparency measures outlined in this article have been designed 
to address some of the most pressing issues in legal education. Every 
suggestion from this article can be accomplished by the Section of Legal 
Education without additional authority from the ABA Standards. In many 
cases, the suggestions can be accomplished without additional reporting 
burdens for law schools. In other cases, schools already possess the data but 
are not required to report it as part of the annual questionnaire. On balance, 
the value of public data will outweigh the costs of reporting in these cases. 
Informed policy choices require a diversity of information and voices. 
What these measures reveal can contribute to change. Whether it amounts to 
progress will come down to the choices made by regulators, schools, and 
consumers. Regardless, clarity is in order. The problems facing legal 
education are as immense as they are important and the foundation for 
addressing them will be high-quality, smartly presented data. 
